Epstein Court Documents July 2019

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit   

AUGUST TERM 2018    No. 18‐2868‐cv    JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD COMPANY,  Intervenors‐Appellants,    v.    GHISLAINE MAXWELL,  Defendant‐Appellee,    v.    VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,  Plaintiff‐Appellee.

      No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)  No. 17‐1625 (CON)  No. 17‐1722(CON)    ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH  MEDIA,  Intervenors‐Appellants,

V.     VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,  Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.    GHISLAINE MAXWELL,  Defendant‐Appellee.*   

On Appeal from the United States District Court  for the Southern District of New York   

ARGUED: MARCH 6, 2019  DECIDED: JULY 3, 2019   
  Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

Intervenors‐Appellants Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich,  and the Miami Herald Company (with reporter Julie Brown) appeal  from certain orders of the United States District Court for the Southern  District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective  motions to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the
                                                 * The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the captions as set out above.


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District Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review  when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time,  we recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may  accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We  therefore  clarify  the  legal  tools  that  district  courts  should  use  in  safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE  the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,  and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment  record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the  District  Court  for  particularized  review  of  the  remaining  sealed  materials. 
Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders  the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a  remand.
 
SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz,  Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on  the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL,  for Intervenors‐Appellants Julie Brown and  Miami Herald.
TY GEE (Adam Mueller, on the brief),  Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,  Denver, CO, for Defendant‐Appellee Ghislaine  Maxwell. 

 PAUL G. CASSELL (Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies  Schiller Flexner LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, on  the brief), S.J Quinney College of Law,  University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for  Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre.
ANDREW G. CELLI JR. (David A. Lebowitz, on  the brief), Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff &  Abady LLP, New York, NY, for IntervenorAppellant Alan M. Dershowitz.
MARC RANDAZZA (Jay Marshall Wolman,  Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal  Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT, for IntervenorAppellant Michael Cernovich.
 
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
Intervenors‐Appellants  Alan  M.  Dershowitz  (“Dershowitz”),  Michael Cernovich (“Cernovich”), and the Miami Herald Company  (with reporter Julie Brown, jointly the “Herald”) appeal from certain  orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of  New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective motions  to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the District  Court  failed  to  conduct  the  requisite  particularized  review  when  ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time, we


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recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may  accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We  therefore  clarify  the  legal  tools  that  district  courts  should  use  in  safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE  the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,  and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment  record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the  District  Court  for  particularized  review  of  the  remaining  sealed  materials.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jeffrey Epstein’s Conviction and the CVRA Suit
The origins of this case lie in a decade‐old criminal proceeding  against financier Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein”). On June 30, 2008, Epstein  pleaded guilty to Florida state charges of soliciting, and procuring a  person  under  the  age  of  eighteen  for,  prostitution.  The  charges  stemmed from sexual activity with privately hired “masseuses,” some  of whom were under eighteen, Florida’s age of consent. Pursuant to  an agreement with state and federal prosecutors, Epstein pleaded to  the state charges. He received limited jail‐time, registered as a sex  offender, and agreed to pay compensation to his victims. In return,  prosecutors declined to bring federal charges. 
Shortly  after  Epstein  entered  his  plea,  two  of  his  victims,  proceeding as “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2,” filed suit against the  Government  in  the  Southern  District  of  Florida  under  the  Crime  Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). The victims sought to nullify the plea


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agreement, alleging that the Government failed to fulfill its legal  obligations to inform and consult with them in the process leading up  to Epstein’s plea deal.1 
On December 30, 2014, two additional unnamed victims—one  of whom has now self‐identified as Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia Giuffre  (“Giuffre”)—petitioned to join in the CVRA case. These petitioners  included in their filings not only descriptions of sexual abuse by  Epstein, but also new allegations of sexual abuse by several other  prominent individuals, “including numerous prominent American  politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a wellknown  Prime  Minister,  and  other  world  leaders,”  as  well  as  Dershowitz (a long‐time member of the Harvard Law School faculty  who had worked on Epstein’s legal defense) and Defendant‐Appellee  Ghislaine Maxwell (“Maxwell”).2 
Dershowitz  moved  to  intervene,  seeking  to  “strike  the  outrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and to  request a show cause order to the attorneys that have made them.”3  Exercising its authority to “strike from a pleading an insufficient
                                                 1  On  February  21,  2019,  the  Florida  District  Court  ruled  that  federal  prosecutors had violated the CVRA by failing to adequately notify the two victimsplaintiffs of the plea deal. The District Court has not yet determined the appropriate  remedy. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204–17 (S.D. Fla. 2019).  2 Doe 1 v. United States, No. 08‐CV‐80736‐KAM, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2 (S.D.  Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  3 Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).



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defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous  matter . . . on its own,”4 the Florida District Court (Kenneth A. Marra,  Judge) sua sponte struck all  allegations against additional parties from  the  pleadings,  including  those  against  Dershowitz,  and  therefore  denied Dershowitz’s motion as moot.5 
The stricken allegations, however, quickly found their way into  the  press,  and  several  media  outlets  published  articles  repeating  Giuffre’s accusations. In response to the allegations, on January 3,  2015,  Maxwell’s  publicist  issued  a  press  statement  declaring  that  Giuffre’s allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue” and that  her “claims are obvious lies.”6 
B. Giuffre Sues Maxwell
On  September  21,  2015,  Giuffre  filed  the  underlying  action  against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. Giuffre alleged  that  Maxwell  had  defamed  her  through  this  and  other  public  statements. Extensive and hard‐fought discovery followed. Due to the  volume of sealing requests filed during discovery, on August 9, 2016,  the  District  Court  entered  a  Sealing  Order  that  effectively  ceded  control of the sealing process to the parties themselves. The Sealing  Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file individual letter  briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of the parties’
                                                 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).  5 Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.  6 See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).


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future sealing requests. In total, 167 documents—nearly one‐fifth of  the docket—were filed under seal. These sealed documents include,  inter alia, motions to compel discovery, motions for sanctions and  adverse inferences, motions in limine, and similar material. 
On  January  6,  2017,  Maxwell  filed  a  motion  for  summary  judgment.  The  parties  submitted  their  memoranda  of  law  and  supporting exhibits contesting this motion under seal. On March 22,  2017, the District Court denied the motion in a heavily redacted 76page  opinion.  Once  again,  the  entire  summary  judgment  record,  including  the  unredacted  version  of  the  District  Court  opinion  denying summary judgment, remained under seal. On May 24, 2017,  Maxwell and Giuffre executed a settlement agreement, and the case  was closed the next day.
C. Motions to Intervene and Unseal
Over  the  course  of  the  litigation  before  Judge  Sweet,  three  outside parties attempted to unseal some or all of the sealed material.  On August 11, 2016, Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to unseal  three documents that, he argues, demonstrate that Giuffre invented  the  accusations  against  him.  On  January  19,  2017,  Cernovich,  an  independent  blogger  and  self‐described  “popular  political  journalist,”7  moved  to  intervene,  seeking  to  unseal  the  summary  judgment record, and Dershowitz joined his motion. On April 6, 2018,  after the case had settled, the Herald moved to intervene and unseal
                                                 7 Br. Appellant (Cernovich) 4.


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the entire docket. The District Court granted each of these motions to  intervene, but denied the related requests to unseal in orders entered  November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018, respectively. 
The  Appellants  timely  appealed  from  each  of  the  orders  denying their respective motions to unseal. Although each Appellant  seeks the release of a different set of documents, all argue that the  District  Court  failed  to  analyze  the  documents  individually  or  properly apply the presumption of public access to court documents.  We therefore ordered that the appeals be heard in tandem and held  argument on March 6, 2019. 
On March 11, 2019, we issued an order to show cause why we  “should not unseal the summary judgment motion, including any  materials filed in connection with this motion, and the District Court’s  summary  judgment  decision.”8  The  parties  timely  filed  their  responses.
II. DISCUSSION
There are two categories of sealed material at issue in these  appeals: (1) the summary judgment record, which includes the parties’  summary judgment briefs, their statements of undisputed facts, and  incorporated exhibits; and (2) court filings made in the course of the  discovery  process  and  with  respect  to  motions  in  limine.  In  this  Opinion,  we  explain  that  our  law  requires  the  unsealing  of  the
                                                 8 Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18‐2868‐cv, Docket No. 138.


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summary  judgment  materials  and  individualized  review  of  the  remaining sealed materials. 
While the law governing public access to these materials is  largely settled, we have not yet adequately addressed the potential  harms that often accompany such access. These harms are apparent.  Over  forty  years  ago,  the  Supreme  Court  observed  that,  without  vigilance,  courts’  files  might  “become  a  vehicle  for  improper  purposes.”9  Our  legal  process  is  already  susceptible  to  abuse.  Unscrupulous  litigants  can  weaponize  the  discovery  process  to  humiliate and embarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the “litigation  privilege,”10 bad actors can defame opponents in court pleadings or  depositions without fear of lawsuit and liability. Unfortunately, the  presumption of public access to court documents has the potential to  exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that  damaging material irrevocably enters the public record.
We therefore take the opportunity to describe the tools available  to district courts in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, and  emphasize the courts’ responsibility to exercise these powerful tools.  We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in  judicial pleadings.
                                                 9 Nixon v. Warner Commcʹns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).  10 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text, post. 



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A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s decision to seal a filing or  maintain such a seal, “we examine the court’s factual findings for clear  error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to seal  or unseal for abuse of discretion.”11 
B. The Summary Judgment Materials
With respect to the first category of materials, it is well‐settled  that  “documents  submitted  to  a  court  for  its  consideration  in  a  summary  judgment  motion  are—as  a  matter  of  law—judicial  documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under  both the common law and the First Amendment.”12 In light of this  strong  First  Amendment  presumption,  “continued  sealing  of  the  documents may be justified only with specific, on‐the‐record findings  that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the  sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”13
                                                 11 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139  (2d Cir. 2016).  12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We  observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may  “be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and nonfrivolous arguments.” Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a  filing,  specifically  found  that  assumption  inapplicable,  the  categorical  rule  in  Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42–43 and accompanying text, post.  13  Id.  at  124.  Examples  of  such  countervailing  values  may  include,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  preserving  “the  right  of  an  accused  to  fundamental fairness in the jury selection process,” Press‐Enter. Co. v. Superior Court



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In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.14 First, it  failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches  to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions.  The District Court reasoned that the summary judgment materials  were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary  judgment  was  denied  by  the  Court.”15  In  assigning  a  “lesser  presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single  sentence of dicta from our decision in United States v. Amodeo.16 We  have  since  clarified,  however,  that  this  sentence  was  based  on  a  “quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C.  Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court  or  the  D.C.  Circuit.”17  In  fact,  we  have  expressly  rejected  the  proposition that “different types of documents might receive different                                                  of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney‐client  privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of impairing law enforcement or  judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the  privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id.  14 Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of  the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief  to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District  Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal.  15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444.   16 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”) (“One judge [in the District  of Columbia Circuit] has pointed out, for example, that where a district court  denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination  of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal  quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)).  17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.



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weights of presumption based on the extent to which they were relied  upon in resolving [a] motion [for summary judgment].”18
Second, in contravention of our precedent, the District Court  failed to review the documents individually and produce “specific, onthe‐record  findings  that  sealing  is  necessary  to  preserve  higher  values.”19 Instead, the District Court made generalized statements  about the record as a whole.20 This too was legal error.
Finally, upon reviewing the summary judgment materials in  connection with this appeal, we find that there is no countervailing  privacy interest sufficient to justify their continued sealing. Remand  with respect to these documents is thus unnecessary. Accordingly, and  to avoid any further delay,21 we order that the summary judgment  documents (with minimal redactions) be unsealed upon issuance of  our mandate.22 
                                                 18 Id. at 123.  19 Id. at 124.  20 See, e.g., Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (summarily concluding that all  “[t]he Summary Judgment Judicial Documents openly refer to and discuss these  allegations [of sexual assault and sexual trafficking] in comprehensive detail, and  that those allegations “establish[] a strong privacy interest here”).  21 Cf. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 127 (ordering that “the mandate shall issue  forthwith” to expedite the unsealing process).  22 Upon issuance of our mandate, a minimally redacted version of the  summary judgment record will be made accessible on the Court of Appeals docket.  We  have  implemented  minimal  redactions  to  protect  personally  identifying  information such as personal phone numbers, contact lists, birth dates, and social



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C. The Remaining Sealed Materials
The law governing disclosure of the remaining sealed material  in this case is only slightly more complex. The Supreme Court has  recognized a qualified right “to inspect and copy judicial records and  documents.”23 In defining “judicial records and documents,” we have  emphasized that “the mere filing of a paper or document with the  court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to  the right of public access.”24 Instead, “the item filed must be relevant  to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial  process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”25 
As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the judicial  function” not only when it rules on motions currently before it, but  also when properly exercising its inherent “supervisory powers.”26 A                                                  security numbers. We have also redacted the names of alleged minor victims of  sexual abuse from deposition testimony and police reports, as well as deposition  responses  concerning  intimate  matters  where  the  questions  were  likely  only  permitted—and the responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of  continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate the views  expressed in Judge Pooler’s separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the  efforts  invested  by  three  former  district  judges  in  reviewing  these  materials  adequately address those concerns.   23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.  24 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”).  25 Id.   26 Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017)  (explaining that, in considering whether the report of a monitor charged with  assessing  compliance  with  a  deferred  prosecution  agreement  is  a  judicial



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document is thus “relevant to the performance of the judicial function”  if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s  ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without  regard  to  which  way  the  court  ultimately  rules  or  whether  the  document  ultimately  in  fact  influences  the  court’s  decision.27  Accordingly, if in applying these standards, a court determines that  documents filed by a party are not relevant to the performance of a  judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.28 
Once an item is deemed relevant to the exercise of judicial  power, “the weight to be given the presumption of access must be  governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article  III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
                                                 document, “[i]f the district court’s conception of its supervisory power in this  context were correct, the Monitor’s Report would quite obviously be relevant to the  performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process” (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  Whether  a  specific  judicial  decision  constitutes  a  “performance of the judicial function” is a question of law. Accordingly, we review  such determinations de novo. Id. at 134.   27 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145–46 (concluding that documents were relevant to  the performance of a judicial function because they would have “informed” the  district court’s decision whether to discharge or retain a Receiver); see also FTC. v.  Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Rule of  Evidence 401’s “having any tendency” definition of relevance in determining  whether documents were “judicial documents”).  28 As we explain below, there are several (often preferable) tools beyond  sealing that district courts can use to protect their dockets from becoming a vehicle  for irrelevant—and potentially defamatory—accusations. See Section D, post.



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monitoring the federal courts.”29 Thus, while evidence introduced at  trial  or  in  connection  with  summary  judgment  enjoys  a  strong  presumption of public access, documents that “play only a negligible  role in the performance of Article III duties” are accorded only a low  presumption that “amounts to little more than a prediction of public  access absent a countervailing reason.”30 Documents that are never  filed  with  the  court,  but  simply  “passed  between  the  parties  in  discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.”31
The remaining sealed materials at issue here include filings  related  to,  inter  alia,  motions  to  compel  testimony,  to  quash  trial  subpoenae, and to exclude certain deposition testimony. All such  motions, at least on their face, call upon the court to exercise its Article  III powers. Moreover, erroneous judicial decision‐making with respect  to such evidentiary and discovery matters can cause substantial harm.  Such materials are therefore of value “to those monitoring the federal  courts.”32 Thus, all documents submitted in connection with, and  relevant to, such judicial decision‐making are subject to at least some  presumption of public access.33
                                                 29 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.  30 Id. at 1050.  31 Id.  32 Id. at 1049.    33 In previous decisions, we have identified an important exception to this  general rule: the presumption of public access does not apply to material that is  submitted to the court solely so that the court may decide whether that same



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Although a court’s authority to oversee discovery and control  the  evidence  introduced  at  trial  surely  constitutes  an  exercise  of  judicial power, we note that this authority is ancillary to the court’s  core role in adjudicating a case. Accordingly, the presumption of  public  access  in  filings  submitted  in  connection  with  discovery  disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than the  presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection  with dispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary  judgment.34  Thus,  while  a  court  must  still  articulate  specific  and  substantial reasons for sealing such material, the reasons usually need  not be as compelling as those required to seal summary judgment  filings. 
Here, the precise basis for the District Court’s decision to deny  the motion to unseal these remaining materials is unclear. In the three  paragraphs devoted to the issue, the District Court emphasized the  potential for embarrassment “given the highly sensitive nature of the  underlying allegations,” and concluded that “the documents sealed in  the course of discovery were neither relied upon by [the District] Court  in the rendering of an adjudication, nor necessary to or helpful in  resolving a motion.”35 It is therefore unclear whether the District Court  held that these materials were not judicial documents (and thus are                                                  material must be disclosed in the discovery process or shielded by a Protective  Order. See TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 233.   34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.  35 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 442 (internal quotation marks and brackets  omitted).


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not subject to a presumption of public access), or found that privacy  interests outweighed a limited right of public access.
On either interpretation, however, the District Court’s holding  was error. Insofar as the District Court held that these materials are not  judicial documents because it did not rely on them in adjudicating a  motion, this was legal error. As explained above, the proper inquiry is  whether the documents are relevant to the performance of the judicial  function,  not  whether  they  were  relied  upon.36  Indeed,  decisionmakers often find that a great deal of relevant material does not  ultimately sway their decision. And insofar as the District Court held  that privacy interests outweigh the presumption of public access in  each of the thousands of pages at issue, that decision—which appears  to have been made without particularized review—amounts to an  abuse of discretion.37
In  light  of  the  District  Court’s  failure  to  conduct  an  individualized review of the sealed materials, it is necessary to do so  now. We believe the District Court is best situated to conduct this  review. The District Court can directly communicate with the parties,  and can therefore more swiftly and thoroughly consider particular  objections to unsealing specific materials. Relatedly, the District Court  can obtain the parties’ assistance in effecting any necessary redactions,  and in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
                                                 36 See text accompanying notes 12–18 and 26–28, ante.  37 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining  that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative, legal “term of art”).


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implicated by the unsealing. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the  District Court to conduct such a particularized review and unseal all  documents for which the presumption of public access outweighs any  countervailing privacy interests.
D. Protecting the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
While we disagree with the District Court’s disposition of the  motions to unseal, we share its concern that court files might be used  to  “promote  scandal  arising  out  of  unproven  potentially  libelous  statements.”38  We  therefore  describe  certain  methods  courts  can  employ to protect the judicial process from being coopted for such  purposes.
The  Supreme  Court  has  explained  that  “[e]very  court  has  supervisory power over its own records and files” to ensure they “are  not used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” or “serve  as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”39 This  supervisory function is not only within a district court’s power, but  also among its responsibilities. 
In practice, district courts may employ several methods to fulfill  this  function.  They  may,  for  instance,  issue  protective  orders  forbidding dissemination of certain material “to protect a party or  person  from  annoyance,  embarrassment,  oppression,  or  undue
                                                 38 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 447.  39 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks).



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burden” and require that filings containing such material be submitted  under seal.40 If parties then seek to file such materials, the court may  deny them leave to do so.41 District courts may also seek to counteract  the effect of defamatory statements by explaining on the record that  the statements appear to lack credibility. Moreover, under Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  12(f),  the  district  court  may  strike  such  material  from  the  filings  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  “redundant,  immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.”42 Because such rejected or  stricken material is not “relevant to the performance of the judicial  function” it would not be considered a “judicial document” and would  enjoy  no  presumption  of  public  access.43  Finally,  in  appropriate
                                                 40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229–30.  41 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, February 1,  2019  Edition,  Rule  6.1,  http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20Rules%20020119%20Final.pdf.  42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts may strike material from the pleadings either  “on its own” or “on motion made by a party.” Id. Although motions to strike  material solely “on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial” are  disfavored, when material is also “scandalous,” no such presumption applies. Cf.  Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Talbot  v.  Robert  Matthews  Distrib.  Co.,  961  F.2d  654,  664  (7th  Cir.  1992)  (“Allegations may be stricken as scandalous if the matter bears no possible relation  to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.”); Wine Markets Intʹl,  Inc. v. Bass, 177 F.R.D. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Motions to strike are not generally  favored, except in relation to scandalous matters.”); Alvarado‐Morales v. Digital  Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617–18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous “matter  which impugned the character of defendants”).  43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.



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circumstances, district courts may impose sanctions on attorneys and  parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).44
E. A Cautionary Note
We conclude with a note of caution to the public regarding the  reliability of court filings such as those unsealed today.
Materials submitted by parties to a court should be understood  for what they are. They do not reflect the court’s own findings. Rather,  they are prepared by parties seeking to advance their own interests in  an  adversarial  process.  Although  affidavits  and  depositions  are  offered “under penalty of perjury,” it is in fact exceedingly rare for  anyone to be prosecuted for perjury in a civil proceeding.45 Similarly,                                                  44 In relevant part, Rule 11 provides:  By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an  attorney or unrepresented party certifies that . . . it is not being presented  for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or  needlessly increase the cost of litigation . . . . [T]he court may impose an  appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the  rule or is responsible for the violation . . . . The sanction may include  nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed  on  motion  and  warranted  for  effective  deterrence,  an  order  directing  payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and  other expenses directly resulting from the violation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (describing sanctions available  to the court).  45 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and  Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) (ʺPerjury cases  are not often pursued . . . .”).



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pleadings,  complaints,  and  briefs—while  supposedly  based  on  underlying evidentiary material—can be misleading. Such documents  sometimes  draw  dubious  inferences  from  already  questionable  material or present ambiguous material as definitive.
Moreover,  court  filings  are,  in  some  respects,  particularly  susceptible to fraud. For while the threat of defamation actions may  deter malicious falsehoods in standard publications, this threat is nonexistent with respect to certain court filings. This is so because, under  New York law (which governs the underlying defamation claim here),  “absolute immunity from liability for defamation exists for oral or  written statements made . . . in connection with a proceeding before a  court.”46 Thus, although the act of filing a document with a court might  be  thought  to  lend  that  document  additional  credibility,  in  fact,  allegations appearing in such documents might be less credible than  those published elsewhere.47 
                                                 46 Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 718 (2015); see also Kelly v. Albarino, 485  F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of the District Court explaining  that this privilege is “the broadest of possible privileges”); Restatement (Second) of  Torts § 587 (1977) (“A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or  defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory  matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial  proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial  proceeding  in  which  he  participates,  if  the  matter  has  some  relation  to  the  proceeding.”). But see note 47, post.  47 While common law courts have generally interpreted the litigation privilege  broadly,  they  nevertheless  maintain  an  important  (if  rarely  implemented)  limitation on its scope: to qualify for the privilege, a statement must be “material  and pertinent to the questions involved.” Front, 24 N.Y.3d at 718 (quoting Youmans



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We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring  the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards  the integrity of the factfinding process.”48 When faithfully observing  its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public  understanding  of  the  rule  of  law”  and  “validates  [its]  claim  of  functioning as surrogates for the public.”49
At  the  same  time,  the  media  does  the  public  a  profound  disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have  previously  observed  that  courts  cannot  possibly  “discredit  every  statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we  have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term  ‘court records’ in referring to such items.”50 Even ordinarily critical
                                                 v.  Smith,  153  N.Y.  214,  219–20  (1897)).  It  follows,  then,  that  immaterial  and  impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they  are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the inference of express malice.” Id.  (same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and  “immaterial,” it makes the very same determination that permits a defamation  action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served  were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation  privilege.  48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)  (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606  (1982)).  49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality  opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).  50 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.


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readers may take the reference to “court papers” as some sort of  marker of reliability.  This would be a mistake.
We therefore urge the media to exercise restraint in covering  potentially defamatory allegations, and we caution the public to read  such accounts with discernment.
III. CONCLUSION
  To summarize, we hold as follows:
(1) Materials  submitted  in  connection  with  a  motion  for  summary judgment are subject to a strong presumption of  public access.
(2)  The summary judgment record at issue will be unsealed  upon  issuance  of  our  mandate,  subject  to  minimal  redactions.51
(3) Materials submitted in connection with, and relevant to,  discovery  motions,  motions  in  limine,  and  other  nondispositive  motions  are  subject  to  a  lesser—but  still  substantial— presumption of public access.
(4) The District Court is directed to review the remaining sealed  materials  individually  and  unseal  those  materials  as  appropriate.
                                                 51 See note 22, ante.


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(5) District  courts  should  exercise  the  full  range  of  their  substantial  powers  to  ensure  their  files  do  not  become  vehicles for defamation.
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  VACATE  the  orders  of  the  District Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August  27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment record as  described herein, and REMAND the cause to the District Court for  particularized review of the remaining materials. 
In undertaking this task, the District Court may be well‐served  by ordering the parties to submit to the Court unredacted, electronic  copies of the remaining sealed materials, as well as specific, proposed  redactions. The District Court may also order the parties to identify  and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be  implicated by disclosure of these materials.
In the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this  matter shall be referred to this panel.


 POOLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
  I join the Court’s opinion in every respect but one: the decision to unseal
the summary judgment record ourselves. I agree that all or most of the material
must be unsealed. Nevertheless, in my view, the district court is better suited to
the task. As the Court’s opinion recognizes in connection with the remaining
sealed materials, the district court is better positioned to communicate with the
parties and any nonparties whose privacy interests might be affected by
unsealing. On that score, it is worth clarifying here the breadth of the Court’s
unsealing order: it unseals nearly 2000 pages of material. The task of identifying
and making specific redactions in such a substantial volume is perilous; the
consequences of even a seemingly minor error may be grave and are irrevocable.
Moreover, although I share the majority’s concern about avoiding delay, I would
alleviate that concern through other means—perhaps with an order directing the
district court to act expeditiously and by making clear what types of limited
redactions are and are not appropriate. In sum, I would unseal the district court’s
summary judgment decision only and leave the remainder of the materials for
the district court to review, redact, and unseal on remand.


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